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PANEL:
STATE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PRIVATE UTILITIES
JOEL GoRA, MODERATOR
JOEL Go.A:* This part of the program deals with legal remedies. Yesterday
one speaker said that he was not sure what kinds of civil liberties issues were
raised by the existence of the nuclear power establishment and all of the
rules, regulations and procedures created as a result of its existence. I think
that since yesterday afternoon the discussion has clarified many of those
problems. It's not necessarily clear what the solutions are, but I think the
issues have been effectively and persuasively identified. It seems to me that
the core of almost any civil liberties concern is the notion of holding power
accountably, holding power responsibly. We look primarily to the Constitu-
tion to do that. Failing that, we look primarily to other sources in law and
conduct. The sequence of discussions is natural. The civil liberties implica-
tions and problems of the existence of a nuclear power establishment having
been identified, the question now is: What remedies are available through
our constitutional scheme? And if our constitutional scheme appears lack-
ing, what remedies are available otherwise?
One of the predicates for this inquiry is that nuclear energy and the
nuclear establishment are different. How much so is an open question, but
they do differ from other forms of sources of power and influence over our
lives. The Supreme Court treats nuclear power as different, and that was
one justification for upholding the Price-Anderson statutory limitation on
nuclear liability. The court said at least three times that nuclear power
possessed a uniqueness which other forms of energy did not. So, given that
uniqueness, given the civil liberties problems that the nuclear industry raises,
the issue now is accountability and control through our Constitution or
other forms of authority. The first speaker to address that issue is Burt
Neuborne, a professor of law at New York University Law School and one
of the most creative civil liberties theoriticians and litigators around.
REmARKs OF BURT NEUBORNE:t Joel's introduction points up a general
problem that we have to face in the next decade: the development of theories
to restrain huge, private accumulations of power. Providing a legal frame-
work for dealing with nuclear power is thus really part of a larger social
problem.
Ed. Note: The footnotes to these remarks have been supplied by the editors for the
reader's information.
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
tProfessor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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The core concern of civil liberties is creating antidotes to the exercise of
large aggregations of power, whoever exercises it. If we have learned any-
thing from the history of the last several centuries, it is that power un-
checked is an enormous danger to the values of individual freedom and
dignity. We have been trained to perceive government as the major danger
to civil liberties because historically government alone has had the capacity
to marshall power sufficient to threaten civil liberties.
In large part, because we have looked at government as the source of
the danger, we, as civil libertarians, have encouraged the growth of organi-
zations which mediate between individuals and the government. Two exam-
ples of mediating organizations that we have encouraged during the twenti-
eth century are labor unions and business corporations. The existence of
these private organizations standing between the individual and the state has
provided a valuable mechanism to set entities off against each other and to
curb what would be an uncontrollable source of power. In consequence,
these mediating organizations have kept us freer by checking the power that
flows from the government. Frankly, that is why many civil libertarians
applauded when corporations were given free speech rights by the Supreme
Court' and when labor unions were given exemptions from the antitrust
laws by the Supreme Court.2
The problem we face now and will face increasingly in the future is how
to protect the individual, not only from the government but from the
mediating organizations themselves as they acquire power. Thus, one of the
greatest challenges that civil libertarians face in the years to come is to forge
theories by which we can begin to place restraints on the mediating organi-
zations, just as we have forged theories to place restraints on the govern-
ment. One approach that is obvious to somebody in the American legal
system is to try to bring private power centers under the same kind of
control as the state by attempting to make the Constitution applicable to
these private power centers.
In legal shorthand, the issue is whether or not the actions of these
private power centers can be deemed to be state action for the purposes of
the Constitution. 3 If they are state action, then we can bring to bear certain
1. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm'n. of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
3. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (privately
owned and operated utility's termination of service held not to constitute state action for
the purpose of the fourteenth amendment); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (land
which was willed in trust to the Mayor and City Council of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a
park for white people only and over which city was trustee for some time held to constitute
state action); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (racially discrimi-
natory operation of a restaurant physically located in a publicly owned and operated
parking building and leased from a state agency held to constitute state action).
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constitutional restrants upon their activities, just as we bring those restraints
to bear on the government. If we cannot, then we have to seek other, more
creative theories to restrain these entities. It does not much matter whether
you call it state action or something else, as long as you have a theory which
effectively places restraints on the acting agency. The Constitution has, by
and large, operated relatively well in our system as a restraint on the
government, and we must now experiment with and develop other theories
that can be brought to bear on these enormous private aggregations of
power.
Let me explore a moment the extent to which the easy route is open.
Can we say, for example, that a public utility is state action and therefore
that we have a ready-made set of concepts all set to be used against the
utility in an attempt to rationalize the exercise of its power?
I should say-and I think it is important at a conference like this to say
it-that the attempt to rationalize power should not be confused with the
attempt to strangle the entity that is exercising the power. The purpose of
the Constitution is not to prevent the government from operating; rather,
the purpose of the Constitution is to rationalize the government's operations
in a way that, at minimum, does not violate civil liberties. Similarly, the way
to look for a theory to deal with private entities is not to look for a theory
that will crush or strangle a private entity. Such an approach guarantees that
the theory will never be accepted. Put simply, if all you have is a theory that
is a disguised way of preventing the development of nuclear power, then I
can assure you that no court is going to buy it, nor should it. If you hope to
formulate a theory that has a chance of working, it has to be a theory that is
designed to rationalize the exercise of power and not to strangle the organi-
zation exercising the power.
The argument for state action in a public utility context is an obvious
one. A public utility exists because the government bestowed a profit-
making monopoly on a private group of people to insulate that private
group of people from any competition. It exists only because the state
decided that it was more efficient or politically preferable to have these
goods and services delivered by a private monopoly than by the state itself.
Therefore, it might follow that the public utility should be treated as an arm
of the state.
The problem with this argument is twofold: First, the state action
argument has been flatly refected by the Supreme Court on more than one
occasion.4 Of course, as Robert Frost once said, "Why abandon a belief
merely because it ceases to be true?" Just because the Supreme Court has
rejected an argument on one or more occasions, is no reason to stop
pressing it if there is an underlying validity to the argument. Thus, although
I believe that there is little likelihood of getting the argument accepted in the
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
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short term, one must, nevertheless, explore the underlying validity of the
argument.
The second problem is that when you look at the underlying validity of
the argument, I think it is in trouble on the merits. I think there is a very
serious problem in attempting to characterize everything that a public utility
does as state action. The argument runs into trouble in the following way.
Fundamentally, a public utility represents a governmental decision to assem-
ble private capital to fulfill a given social purpose more efficiently than
using the government's taxing power to assemble the same capital.
This is precisely the reason that business corporations arose in America
in the nineteenth century. That means that we made a political judgment
that we want a private entity, not government, to do something. Of course,
that is a hotly debatable political point, and you may disagree with the
decision to sanction private, rather than publicly owned, utilities, but that
arrangement does accomplish certain ends. However, by definition, if you
have a public utility, that argument is lost. The decision has already been
made to let a private entity assemble and manage capital.
If you then seek to impose on that private entity precisely the legal
restraints that are imposed on the government by insisting that private entity
be treated as state action, then the effect is to checkmate the benefits that
are supposedly going to flow from having private, instead of public, utili-
ties. If the private entity must act precisely the same as a public entity, then
you have to ask the question, why use a private entity in the first place? I
suspect that that argument is going to doom any attempt at a full-scale
imposition of state action on public utilities, and perhaps it should in order
to maintain economic efficiency.
All of this is not to say that the battle is over on the state action issue. It
is simply to say that the battle must become more sophisticated. Thus far
advocates have attempted to impose wholesale the doctrinal implications of
the state action label. They have attempted, for example, to require public
utility decisions to terminate an employee or to site a plant to be treated as
though they were the decisions of government. A more sophisticated way of
approaching this problem is to ask whether a public utility is state action for
certain purposes, not for all purposes, and certainly not for its economic
operations.
Is certain public utility behavior state action? Frankly, I think the state
action label is nothing more than a legal conclusion that for certain purposes
large accumulations of power ought to be subject to constitutional con-
straints. I think that if you divide entities' behavior into three general areas,
equality, free speech, and procedure, then perhaps there is room for the
development of a theory.
Taking equality, for example, suppose there were no public statutes
regulating racial and ethnic discrimination in hiring and firing. If a public
utility were to announce that it was going to hire only whites or Republicans
or that it was going to exercise some other form of invidious discrimination,
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then it seems that there would be a plausible argument that such economic
entities which owe their advantageous positions to society's sufferance,
ought never to discriminate against the equality norms of the Constitution.
Therefore, for equality purposes, a plausible argument can be made that
utilities' actions are state action. Indeed, the precedent that stands in the
way of making public utilities state action is procedural due process prece-
dent, 5 not equality precedent. The two should be clearly distinguished. The
procedural due process cases are at the other end of the spectrum. For
precisely the economic reasons that I have discussed, the courts have consist-
ently rejected that state action argument in a procedural due process con-
text."
So on the one hand are the equality cases, and on the other hand are the
procedural due process cases. In the middle are the first amendment cases,
the free expression cases. When an agglomeration of power begins to exer-
cise its power contrary to free expression or contrary to free expression
principles, what constitutional guarantees can be brought to bear on that
power? That is a very different question than asking whether procedural due
process guarantees can be brought to bear on that power.
I suggest to you that it is in the areas of equality and first amendment
rights that the fight on state action is going to be waged in the next several
years. It is a fight which is not as hopeless as the current precedents might
suggest. The only way the battle can be lost for sure is to view state action as
a whole without making sophisticated judgments about what should be
covered by the Constitution's guarantees. There is at least a fighting chance
to establish state action for the purposes of equality and free speech norms,
especially if advocates give up the Custer-like attempt to impose procedural
due process norms on privately-owned utilities.
If a private entity, any private entity, adopts rules under government
pressure, then there is a much stronger traditional argument for state
action.7 If one can show, for example, that utilities established surveillance
rules or security rules in response to governmental pressure, then you have a
totally different ball game in terms of state action. Those types of rules may
well be considered as state action regardless of what they regulate. But, in
the absence of that governmental pressure, I think the three-tiered approach
that I suggested is the way that this problem should be analyzed in the
future.
Finally, the world does not begin and end with the Constitution. State
action is not the only way to go. There are a whole host of interesting and
innovative devices to check private entities under tort law and under con-
5. See, e.g., id.
6. See, e.g., id.
7. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1157-61 (1978 & Supp.
1979).
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tract law. The notion of wrongful discharge, for example, has only begun to
evolve in the last few years. 8 That notion had never been taken seriously in
the law before, but the existence of that tort of wrongful discharge is
evidence of the fact that some courts are becoming aware of the need to
restrain private as well as governmental power. It would be, I think, a
serious mistake for lawyers working in this area to focus solely on the
Constitution, because I suspect that more creative and effective means lie
with traditional state law theories.
JOEL GoRA: Thank you, Burt. The next member of our panel, Paul
Chevigny, is also a professor of law at NYU Law School. Prior to coming
into teaching, he spent a decade as a lawyer with the New York Civil
Liberties Union, trying to bring a little accountability and responsibility into
the law enforcement establishment. Tackling the nuclear industry will be a
piece of cake after that. Paul.
REMARKS OF PAUL CHEVIGNY:* This talk to some extent provides detailed
footnotes to Burt Neuborne's presentation. I agree that an across-the-board
application of fourteenth amendment concepts to private entities, even large
private entities, is unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future. In this
connection, it is valuable to note David Kairys' thesis about the radical
break in American constitutional jurisprudence between private and state
action. As he mentioned, the distinction is quite arbitrary, and many private
entities are larger than those that are treated as state entities. For instance, a
great many private corporations are larger than most municipalities, and
some multinational corporations are more powerful than the countries in
which they have their headquarters.
The Supreme Court has refused to treat private entities uniformly as
public entities because of the attendant problems, such as possible interfer-
ence with their freedom of association. Insofar as there is a tradition of
pulling private entities into the public sphere, it has been limited to those
private enterprises whose activities resemble the activities of the state. The
classic case is Marsh v. Alabama,I the company town case. Marsh involved
a piece of private property which assumed the aspect of a municipality, and
the Court therefore treated it as a state entity.
8. E.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980);
Monge v. Beede Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See generally Comm. on
Labor and Employment Law, At Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal,
36 REC. A.B. Cn-y N.Y. 170 (1981); Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967);
Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816 (1980); Note, A Common Law Action for the
Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975).
*Professor Of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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The better example for our purposes is the famous set of cases involv-
ing shopping centers. Logan Valley Plaza2 was a case in which a shopping
center in the middle of a suburb served the same function as the company
town's business district in Marsh. In that case, the Supreme Court prohib-
ited the use of state trespass laws to enjoin picketing at the shopping center,
even though it was privately owned. The difficulty with that case is that it
was overruled in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner3 and Hudgens v. NLRB.4 Shortly
after that group of decisions, however, the Supreme Court handed down the
Pruneyard Shopping Centers decision which points a way out of the Logan
Valley problems so long as one is not confined to the federal constitution.
Pruneyard Shopping Center was a California case in which, under the
California state constitution, the state supreme court expanded free speech
rights in relation to the real property rights of a shopping center's owners.,
In other words, the California court reinstituted the rule that persons have a
right to speak in privately owned shopping centers, notwithstanding the
private property rights of their owners. The California decision, which the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld, effectively revived the Logan Valley Plaza
doctrine under California law.
The upshot of Pruneyard is that there is power in the state constitution,
and presumably in state legislatures and administrative agencies like public
service commissions, to regulate economic relations in the interest of in-
creasing the civil liberties of the people. The question that went to the
Supreme Court in Pruneyard was: If there is a conflict between an increase
in the liberties under state law and the right to manage one's private prop-
erty as one wishes, which should triumph? In this case state law triumphed.
The Court held that California had the power to expand the liberties of its
citizens as against the solely economic rights of Pruneyard's owners.
Pruneyard alone is not going to solve the problem, however, because
Pruneyard's owners had no first amendment interests, or at least they
advanced none, in the expression at their shopping center. On that basis the
Supreme Court distinguished all the cases in which there were competing
first amendment interests. For example, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo7 the Supreme Court held that a state cannot force a newspaper to
print a particular editorial in answer to another editorial. The Court rea-
soned that such a law would be a content-based restriction on the freedom
of the press, repugnant to the first amendment, rather than merely an
2. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 30S
(1968).
3. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
4. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
5. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (19SO).
6. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979).
7. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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interference with private property rights. Pruneyard did not involve such
considerations.
Pruneyard is only the beginning. There are some other cases which
provide further insight into whether there is a right to reply to public utility
speech with respect to nuclear power problems. In the Supreme Court
decisions concerning the public utility speech, the Central Hudson8 and
Consolidated Edison9 cases, the Supreme Court held that the New York
Public Service Commission could not prohibit a utility from mailing written
materials with its bills. In other words, a utility could not be prohibited
from sending out its ideas in its bills. The Court did say something in dictum
which is really very peculiar, however. They said it might be possible to
require the utility to include a reply in the envelope.' 0
The salient question is thus: On what theory could one, consistent with
the constitution, require a private entity to include a written reply in its
regular mailings? There are cases which address such a right of reply,
particularly in connection with television and radio broadcasting, in which
the owner controls access to a uniquely limited means of communication."
In those cases, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a state has the
power to provide for some sort of reply with respect to the information
broadcast over the airwaves. Another case involving the first amendment
speech of corporations is First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 12 In
that case, the argument was made that limits on corporate speech are needed
because corporations have such enormous economic power; however, the
Court found no proof in the record that the First National Bank of Boston
had any such power.' 3 The implication is that if there had been such proof,
the Court might have reached a different decision.
Taking all those decisions together, it might be argued that a state can,
as a matter of state law, require a right of reply to public utility speech
concerning nuclear energy. There is a monopoly of information with respect
to nuclear power under the Atomic Energy Act,' 4 a monopoly which is
derived from the government. Furthermore, there is a special state function
with respect to nuclear power which is delegated to the utilities. The utilities
have, of course, a state-created monopoly on the production of power.
Finally, energy consumers pay for the mailing, so there is the interest of
dissenting ratepayers. Taking all of these factors together and analogizing to
8. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
9. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
10. Id. at 543.
11. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Columbia Broad-
casting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
12. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
13. Id. at 789-90.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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the FCC cases, I think that states may well be able to compel the utilities to
mail replies.
This may seem like very small game, but I am using it to illustrate a way
to cut into the problem. Some might say at this point that this is hopeless,
that it is futile to press state legislatures, agencies, or courts to adopt these
ideas. But, as Mr. Kairys said with respect to Supreme Court doctrine, it is
at bottom a political matter, and I venture to say that it is a much easier
political task than getting the Supreme Court to change its views with
respect to state action. Moreover, it is obvious from the Pruneyard case that
it is a great deal easier to persuade a state legislature or a state court using
the state constitution to adopt these ideas than it is to persuade the Supreme
Court to change its views.
I want to say a couple of other things about state-created limitations
upon the property rights of utilities. There is constant talk abut abusive
"spookery" by the utilities, to borrow the term used by Frank Donner.
Utilities do not have a right, as far as I can see, to spy upon other people.
Thus, a rule imposed either by a public service commission or by state law
limiting the use of surveillance seems to me to present no constitutional
problems. Similarly, state legislatures can control broadly the abuse of
private detective services through licensing and other controls. For instance,
states have recently passed laws which forbid the use of lie detectors as a
condition of employment,' 5 and at least two of these laws have been upheld
against constitutional attack.1 6 The abuse of power by private investigative
agencies is clearly within the power of the state to regulate.
The problem is that there is no political will on the part of the states to
halt abuses. But that, you see, is part of the endemic problem of a protest
against a set of conditions such as the conditions with respect to nuclear
power. The modification of such conditions is basically a political problem
which must be approached through political means. Those political means
may use the law as their instrument, but reform cannot be realized by force
of the Constitution alone. It can only be realized through political power:
action through the courts, through the legislatures, and through state consti-
tutions.
I have one final point. It has been said here over and over again,
somewhat to my surprise, that private nuclear power is in its twilight and
that the future development of nuclear power is going to be remitted to the
government. If that is so, then the due process problems of reaching out to
control private abuses are considerably simplified, although they certainly
do not disappear.
15. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1981 Supp.).
16. Minnesota v. Century Camera, 309 N.W. 2d 735 (1981); New Jersey v. Commu-
nity Distrib., 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974).
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JOEL GoRA: The third member of the panel is Michael Lesch, a partner in
the law firm of Shea & Gould. Mr. Lesch has represented several public
utilities in a number of matters and, more particularly, is counsel to the
Long Island Lighting Company in the Shad Alliance lawsuit. Mr. Lesch is
going to talk about some of these problems from that perspective. Mr.
Lesch.
REMARKS OF MICHAEL LESCH:* Thank you. When I saw the title of this
Symposium, I asked several participants what was intended, because I for
one did not see any civil liberties implications peculiar to nuclear power
development. And then I sat here and heard John Shattuck say that, accord-
ing to his analysis, nuclear power is threatening to civil liberties, but not
uniquely threatening. Then I heard Burt Neuborne say that what civil
liberties is really all about is the protection of the individual against any
great aggregation of power, but that historically this has been limited to
cases involving state action.
Having heard these gentlemen and having considered the matter fur-
ther, I now suggest to you that the decision whether or not to use nuclear
power does not raise civil liberties issues. First, utilities do not represent
enormous aggregations of political power threatening to the individual,
which is the historic concern of civil liberties law. In recognition of this fact,
the Supreme Court has held that a utility's summary termination of service
is not state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.' Nor should
we expand the state action doctrine to encompass investor-owned utilities. It
is simplistic to believe that because utilities control tremendous aggregations
of capital in the form of generators, transmission and distribution lines,
poles, substations, and other operating equipment, they have power of the
sort which constitutes a threat to civil liberties (which I will hereinafter refer
to as "political power").
One indication of utilities' lack of political power is the electric utility
industry's lack of success in fostering nuclear power plants in this country in
the 1970's. A second indication is that utilities are so heavily regulated by
state public service commissions (to say nothing of federal regulation)2 that
the industry now is in a poor, if not precarious, financial condition. Twenty
or thirty years ago utilities' stocks and bonds were the investments of
widows and orphans. Now anybody who invests in utility securities is taking
*Partner, Shea & Gould, New York, New York.
1. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2232 (a) (1976) (authorizing the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue licenses for nuclear power plants upon a finding
that the facility "will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public");
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980) (providing for regulation of the structure and financing of utility companies), Fed-
eral Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (regulating interstate
transactions in electric power).
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a substantial risk. Overall, electric utility common stocks are selling at
approximately 80% of book value, compared to more than 140%0 of book
value in the mid-1960's. Not only that, but most utilities cannot even earn
their allowed rates of return. Indeed, that is probably a principal reason why
the prices of electric utility common stocks are currently so low.
A third factor demonstrating utilities' lack of political power is that
many states have encouraged governmental authorities to take over private
utilities' assets, to manage them, and to sell power directly to the public.3
For example, the Power Authority of the State of New York has recently
encouraged several counties to pass resolutions to study the establishment of
county authorities to operate such utilities and to sell low-cost hydropower
directly to the public; Westchester County, Orange County, Niagara County
and others in New York State are considering submission of this issue to the
public in the form of a referendum.
In addition to the fact that electric utilities do not represent enormous
aggregations of political power which threaten individual freedoms, there is
another reason why nuclear power does not present civil liberties issues.
Civil liberties issues are constitutional issues to be decided by the courts. The
decision as to the type of fuel to generate electricity is in no sense a
constitutional issue, but is a classic problem for popularly elected legisla-
tures because it requires the resolution of conflicts among divergent interests
in the community.
A close examination of the energy problem confirms this view. One fuel
is oil. But oil, particularly foreign oil, is very expensive, and its use will
result in rate increases. Thus, if this choice is made the ratepayers will
protest, and there will also be less oil available for other enterprises which
may not have as many alternative fuels available. Another fuel is coal, but
coal causes environmental problems. A third alternative is solar energy, but
almost everyone agrees that its use on the scale necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the utility industry is impractical. A fourth alternative is
hydropower, but it is indisputable that there is insufficient hydropower
available to keep the nation's electricity generators operating at their current
level. A fifth alternative is nuclear energy. As you are aware, nuclear energy
raises questions concerning the health and safety of populations residing
near nuclear power plants.
To analyze the alleged "civil liberties abuses" of utility companies is to
confirm the foregoing views. Mr. Peterzell's report, 4 for example, is the
source principally cited by persons at this Symposium who urge the need for
civil liberties safeguards on utilities' use of nuclear power. But, to a large
extent, the examples of abuses which Mr. Peterzell cited were not by utility
3. See, e.g., Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 45 N.Y.2d 482, 382 N.E.2d
1139, 410 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1978).
4. J. Peterzell, Nuclear Power and Political Surveillance, Center for National Secur-
ities Studies, Rep. No. 106 (1981).
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companies, but by governmental agencies called in on the occasion of
threats to utility company property. Accordingly, such abuses are protected
against by well-established constitutional doctrines and are in no sense
peculiar to the nuclear power industry.
Indeed, I submit that the utilities in many of these incidents are the
victims, not the perpetrators, of tortious and criminal acts. For example,
Long Island Lighting Company, which I represent, has sought an injunction
against the physical blockading of its properties by members of an organiza-
tion known as the Shad Alliance who sought to prevent the construction of a
nuclear generating station at Shoreham, Long Island.5 I emphasize that
Long Island Lighting has not been the victim of demonstrations, because
everyone is entitled to demonstrate, and no utility with which I am familiar
contests that principle. Rather, Long Island Lighting company has been the
victim of physical interference with its ongoing activities as a public utility.
In 1979 demonstrators pulled down a fence, attacked guards, and
trespassed upon the Shoreham property until they were arrested. In fact, a
principal item of evidence in our case is a Shad Alliance pamphlet which
advocated a blockade on September 29, 1980 "to block all access to the
Shoreham nuclear plant!" The pamphlet showed on its cover a large num-
ber of people with their arms linked together in front of a fence to bar the
entrance of workers into the construction site. The pamphlet stated, in
relevant part:
The Citizen's Strike is seen as part of a continuum of actions,
begun in 1967 and continuing until the successful halt in construc-
tion and ultimate sealing of the plant. The Citizen's Strike will
include a wide variety of nonviolent tactics, some legal and some
extra-legal, and will be preceeded [sic] and followed by intensive
local community organizing activities.... the Blockade will de-
pend upon large numbers of people placing their bodies between
the nuclear power plant and all worker and material traffic. Clus-
ters of affinity groups will sit, lie down, camp out, at the three
gates on North Country Road. Creative affinity group activities
such as possibly chaining gates shut, forming human chains on
pyramids, etc., are to be encouraged. As this is a rural setting, all
workers either drive or are bused to the work site. We will probably
not be confronting pedestrians, but instead will need to form hu-
man blockades large enough to discourage vehicular passage.0
Long Island Lighting Company went to court to seek an injunction to
prevent actions such as those described above which, notwithstanding pro-
5. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Shad Alliance, No. 80-17, 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed
Sept. 18, 1980).
6. Shad Alliance pamphlet 4-6 (emphasis added).
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tests to the contrary, presented an obvious risk of violence. On September
25, 1980 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a temporary restraining order enjoining such a blockade.7 In
violation of the order, on September 29, 1980 hundreds of persons block-
aded the entrance to the Shoreham plant, and 150 were arrested for criminal
trespass. In short, it is my view that if that particular case raises a civil
liberties issue, it is the liberty of the utility company to pursue its work
without violent intrusions by others. There is no civil liberties issue at all
presented by persons seeking to conduct an illegal blockade.
On the other hand, anti-nuclear activists have raised claims about
improper "surveillance" or "infiltration" by the utility companies.8 I
suggest to you that the concepts of "infiltration" or "surveillance" are
meaningless when applied to these groups because they proclaim that they
have no members and that their meetings are open to everyone. Moreover,
when a utility company is threatened by violent action, not demonstrations
but "blockades" and the destruction of utility properties, then the utility
has a right to protect itself by gathering information.
The Peterzell report also cites instances where individuals unsuccess-
fully urged the demonstrators to adopt violent tactics.9 Obviously to the
extent that such speech is not protected by the first amendment, that consti-
tuted an improper act, and there ought to be a legal remedy against it.
Similarly, where individuals are arrested by state police for distributing
anti-nuclear literature, as Mr. Peterzell says happened in 1977 pursuant to
orders of Governor Meldrin Thompson of New Hampshire, 10 I would agree
that such action is unconstitutional. Remedies are available in actions for
false arrest under state law and for violation of federal constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et. seq.
However, in these cases the defendant was not the utility company but
a state or federal officer, so state action was clearly present. Further, in
7. The company filed suit in New York state court. Defendants removed the action to
federal court. Defendants removed the action to federal court. After the court issued a
temporary restraining order (and after the defendants violated that order), it determined
that it lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court.
8. This is a principal thrust of the Peterzell report, supra note 4. An earlier "civil
liberties" claim was that the licenses of all nuclear plants and virtually all other nuclear fuel
cycle activities should be revoked under the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition
against deprivation "of life... without due process of law." This contention was decisively
laid to rest in a scholarly opinion by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See 46 Fed. Reg.
39,573 (1981). The Commission noted that the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit
government action taken with the overt purpose of depriving particular individuals of life.
See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Indeed, if these amendments
prohibited government-authorized activity which could foreseeably lead to deaths among
members of the public, they would preclude, among other things, air, sea, and land
transportation and the use of certain fuels such as coal, all of which, even without
negligence, can result in some fatalities.
9. J. Peterzell, supra note 4, at 25-26.
10. Id. at 29.
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these cases it was not "infiltration" or "surveillance" that was improper,
but incitement to violence or the arrest of a person exercising her constitu-
tional rights.
So I leave you with the proposition that there is little reason to apply
constitutional principles designed to protect civil liberties to utility compan-
ies seeking to build nuclear power plants, just as there is little reason to
apply such principles to most other private institutions in our society.
Perhaps this Symposium would do well to address the more serious threats
that emanate not from the private sector, but from the government, which
are, after all, the traditional concerns of those seeking to protect our civil
liberties.
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